Under the new normal background, the technological innovation capability of technological-based enterprises has developed into an important force to promote a country or region economy development. This paper constructs the three-party evolutionary game model including government, SEM and employee, analyzes the key factors that influence the innovational strategic choices of three parties in in the game under different conditions, and simulate this kind of strategic choice through the use of simulation algorithm. The results make it clear that there exists difference between corporation and employee influenced by the willingness of government, and the corporation is more sensitive to the penalty and financial support from government; The cost of technological innovation is a key barrier for corporation and employee to do innovation.
Introduction
Technological innovation is a key cog in the machine of economic development, and moreover, is the very important method which drives economic development to switch over from "factor-driven, investment-driven" to "innovation-driven". Currently, China's economic development has grown into the "new normal". In this context, it has clearly proposed by the 19th National Congress of the CPC as an important policy that China will further deepen reform of the science and technology management system, establish the science and technology innovation system which is dominated by enterprises, guided by market demand, and integrated deeply with industries, universities and research institutes, and strengthen support for SMEs in innovation activities. Among them, as the main body of the technological innovation, enterprises, not only in regional economic development [1] [2] [3] , but also in the reform of supply-side reform, are an important driven-force [4] . However, high risks of technological innovation are a handicap which reduce the willingness of enterprises to participate in the technology innovation [5] . According to Zhao's [6] research report about IT innovation in six industries, with around 88.45% of scientific activities in the enterprise failed or have to end.
There are still some shortages to be found when reviewing literature available, although researchers have made impressive progress in research of enterprise technological innovation. Firstly, it was universal that the majority of existing researches just considered two game bodies--government and enterprise, but neglected important function of employees. However, recent studies have found that stuff was critical for company's technological innovation [7, 8] . Liang et al. showed in research of complex information system in corporation that individual perception of team environment was a pre-requisite factor influencing individual innovation behavior, thus improving work performance [9] . Maruping and Magni showed in research of technical collaboration in team contexts that staff willingness to innovate was the basis for success [10] . According to Luo et al. individual spirit and ability to innovate play an important role in the enterprise's innovative creativities [11] . Secondly, the current game model of technological innovation involving government participation, it often considered the financial support, but neglected the impact of policy support upon strategic choice of a corporation. Thirdly, it does not take it into account the degree that the main bodies are willing to do innovation in the process of the game how to affect the strategic choice of three parties.
For the reasons mentioned above, based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces individuals as one of the main bodies in technological innovation into game model, and construct a three-party evolutionary game model including government guidance, enterprise participation and employee implementation. Then, based on the bounded rationality theory, this paper will calculate by the use of numerical simulation the evolution path of game bodies in in different situation, find out the stability strategy of three-party, and finally give suggestions to SMEs how to better promote technological innovation.
Tripartite Game Model and Basic Hypothesis

Basic Assumptions and Parameter Settings
In china, small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) generally refer to such a corporation whose staff size and operation scale are relatively small. Generally, it is profit maximization what SMEs pursue in technical innovation. The innovation ability and willingness of staff as a concrete implementer of technological innovation are key factors to determine whether enterprise technological innovation successes or not [11] . It is welfare and income maximization what staff pursue at work. Government, as supervisor and conductor of market, can get extra tax revenue from enterprise technological innovation. Therefore, this paper makes the following assumptions.
(1) Game bodies and strategic sets. Government(G), enterprise(C), employee(E) are the main participants in the game model of government guidance, enterprise participation and employee implementation. Among them, when facing the technological innovation, Government performs primarily the functions of social supervision and guidance, provide SMEs with policy support and fund subsidy in the course of technological innovation, therefore, the government pure strategic choices are {support, nonsupport}; Enterprise, as one of main participants and the seeker of profit maximization, determine whether or not respond to government innovation strategies in line with its own actual demand, therefore, its pure strategic choices are {innovation, non-innovation}. Finally, Employees, as implementor of technological innovation, their cognitive resources are limited [14] , but technological innovation requires them to pay more time and energy and puts forward new requirements and challenges to their work [17], therefore, their pure strategic choices are {willingness, unwillingness}.
(2) Cost coefficient assumption for technological innovation. It will generate a fixed-cost, 1 supposed, when government, as guide and supervisor, needs to perform social functions such as coordination and supervision and to provide policy support to enterprises who are willing to engage in technological innovation; It is bound to generate an additional cost, 1 supposed, when enterprise and its employees, as the main practitioners of technological innovation, need to consume manpower, finical and material resources in the process of technological innovation; Government preferential policies can reduce the cost that enterprise and its employees have to pay in technological innovation, and this cost reduction range is set to be ∆S. The cost of enterprise and its employees will change to 1 − ∆S in the context of which government supports for innovation. According to this logic sequence, if the coefficient α is used to describe the percentage of which is shared by enterprise and its employees in the total cost 1 , then, the costs of enterprise and its employees can be represented as α( 1 − ∆S) and (1 − α)( 1 − ∆ ) respectively while the government strategic choice is "Support"; Otherwise, the costs can be α 1 and (1 − α) 1 respectively.
(3) Benefits coefficient assumption for technological innovation. Here always assumes that technological innovation be bound to bring positive benefits. Therefore, government can be able to obtain the extra tax revenue which comes from net income increased by technological innovation of the enterprises, while the government choices the "support" strategy, and this extra tax revenue is set to be ; If the coefficient is used to describe the ratio of benefits between "support" strategy and "nonsupport" strategy of the government, then he benefit, which the government can be able to obtain under the guidance of "not support" strategy, is presented as ; In addition, let and present respectively the original income of the enterprise and its employees before technological innovation.
When enterprises and employees are both willing to technological innovation, that is, the enterprise's strategy choices are "innovation" and employee's strategy is "willingness", then the total extra income which comes from innovation can be record as . If the sharing coefficient is used to describe a benefit rate between enterprises and employees in this situation, thus, the enterprise's and employee's income can be calculated as and (1 − ) respectively. When only on party are willing to participate technological innovation. That is, the enterprise's strategy choice is "innovation" and employee's strategy choice is "unwillingness" or the enterprise's strategy choice is "no innovation" and employee's strategy choice is "willingness". Thus, the extra revenue from single party is denoted by . If the sharing coefficient is used to describe a benefit rate between enterprises and employees in this situation, thus, the enterprise's and employee's income can be calculated as and (1 − ) respectively ( > ). (4) Rewards or punishments/welfare transfer coefficients. The government, as guide of social activities, provides not only favorable policy but also financial support to the enterprises who are willing to do technology innovation, while it choices "support" strategy, here set this welfare transfer coefficient as 2 ; Moreover, technological innovation is one of the sources of SMEs' core competence. According to the previous researcher's conclusions, the technical innovation of enterprises not only takes up extra resources of its own and its employees [12] , but also usually accompany with huge risks [6, 13] . That is, enterprise and its employees, when one is willing, but not both, to do innovation, the innovative behavior will inevitably lead to redistribution of resources within the enterprise. when enterprise is unwilling but its employees are willing to engage in innovation, thus, employees' innovative behaviors will require additional units of resources from the enterprise, for example, employees who are willing to innovate could take 2 hours out of 8 legal working hours to explore new technologies, in this way, the status of employees changes to gain + units of benefits from enterprise, while the status of enterprise changes to lose − units; Similarly, when employees are unwilling but enterprise is willing to do innovation, thus, enterprise who is willing to engage in innovation will impose penalties on its employees, and the method of punishment may be reducing the merit pay or cutting down the welfare to employees such as paid vacation or travel etc; in this way, the status of enterprise changes to gain + units of benefits from employees, and the status of employees changes to lose − units.
Construction of Game Matrix
In game model, government(G), enterprise(C), employee(E) make a reasonable strategy choice according to self-situation. Assume that the probability that the government makes choice of "support", enterprise makes choice of "innovation" and employees make choice of "willingness" are , , respectively. Then, combined with the above four sets of assumptions, the pay-off matrix of tri-game cab be able to calculated out as shown in the Table1, when government makes choice of support or non-support strategies, facing technical innovation problems. 
Analysis of Evolution Results of Tripartite Game Model
Expected Utility and Replication Dynamic Equation Derivation
According to Table1, the expected benefits of the government(G), enterprise(C) and employee(E) are as follows:
(1) The expected revenue of the government Suppose that 1 represents the government's expected return when it choose the "Support" strategy;
2 represents the government's expected return when it choose the "Non-support" strategy; ̅̅̅̅ represents the government's average expected return, then,
The government's replication dynamic equation can be calculated out as follow:
(2) The expected revenue of the enterprise Suppose: 1 represents the enterprise's expected return when it choose the "innovation" strategy; 2 represents the enterprise's expected return when it choose the "Noninnovation" strategy; ̅̅̅ represents the enterprise's average expected return, then, (3) The expected revenue of the employees Suppose: 1 represents the employee's expected return when they choose the "willingness" strategy; 2 represents the employee's expected return when they choose the "unwillingness" strategy; ̅̅̅ represents the employee's average expected return, then,
The employee's replication dynamic equation can be calculated out as follow:
In summary, the replicated dynamic system of tri-game can be as follow:
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy of Replicated Dynamic System
According to the method proposed by Friedman [13] , the equations in the dynamic system mentioned above are respectively subjected to partial derivatives of , and , thus, the Jacobian Matrix can be obtained as follows:
 In the dynamic system, let ( ) = ( ) = ( ) = 0, here can calculate 8 local equilibrium points and a saddle point. Because the saddle point is an unstable point and do not have practical meaning, this article will not be covering. Then, introduce 8 local equilibrium points into the Jacobian Matrix , corresponding eigenvalue matrix as follows: Table 2 . Eigenvalues corresponding to local equilibrium points. equilibrium λ 1 (Government) λ 2 (Enterprise) λ 3 (Employee)
Stability Analysis in Different Equilibrium Conditions
According to Lyapunov first law [14] , if and only if the eigenvalue corresponding to each equilibrium points is negative in the three-party game, it indicates that the situation has reached an equilibrium steady state(ESS) [15, 16] . In the context of the "new normal", it is a must to admit the decisive role of market in resource allocation and, in the meantime, to play the guiding and coordinating functions of government in the market. Therefore, it is necessary for government to guide, coordinate and promote SMEs to carry out technological innovation in "new normal". Thus, without loss of generality, this article only discusses the results of the three-party game strategy selection, that is (1 − δ) − 1 − 2 > 0, when government plays the role of guidance and supervision. When + + 2 − − ( 1 − ∆ ) > 0 and (1 − ) + − (1 − )( 1 − ∆ ) > 0, that is, the benefits obtained of SME exceed its costs paid for technological innovation when it make choice of innovation startey and,in the meantime, the net income obtained of employees is greater than their cost paid for innovation when they are willing to do innovation, there is only one stable result 8 (1,1,1) according to Table 2 and, in this case, the evolutionary game stability strategies of tri-game become to be {support, innovation, willingness}.
When + + 2 − − ( 1 − ∆ ) > 0 and (1 − ) + − (1 − )( 1 − ∆ ) > 0, that is, the benefits of the SMEs from the technological innovation exceed the cost and employees are willing to innovate because their net income is greater than cost. According to Table 2 , in this case there is only one stable result 8 (1,1,1 ) and the evolutionary game stability strategies of three parties is {support, innovation, willingness}.
When + − + 2 − ( 1 − ∆ ) < 0 and (1 − ) + − (1 − )( 1 − ∆ ) < 0, that is, the benefits obtained of SME are inferior to the costs paid for technological innovation when it choses unilaterally innovation strategies and, in the meantime, the net income obtained of employees is less than the cost paid for innovation when they are unilaterally willing to do innovation, Then there is only one stable result 4 (1,0,0) and the evolutionary game stability strategies of tir-game becomes to be {support, no innovation, no willingness}.
When + − + 2 − ( 1 − ∆ ) > 0 and (1 − ) + − (1 − )( 1 − ∆ ) < 0, that is, the benefits obtained of SME exceed the cost paid for technological innovation when it choses unilaterally innovation strategies and, in the meantime, the net income obtained of employees is less than the cost paid for innovation when they are unilaterally willing to do innovation, Then there is only one stable result 5 (1,1,0 ) and the evolutionary game stability strategies of tir-game becomes to be {support, innovation, no willingness}.
When + + 2 − − ( 1 − ∆ ) < 0 and (1 − ) + − (1 − )( 1 − ∆ ) > 0, that is, the benefits obtained of SME are inferior to the cost paid for technological innovation when it choses innovation strategies and, in the meantime, the net income obtained of employees is greater than the cost paid for innovation when they are unilaterally willing to do innovation, then there is only one stable result 6 (1,0,1) and the evolutionary game stability strategies of tir-game becomes to be {support, no innovation, willingness}. In summary, the stability results in different situations are shown in Table 3 . Table 3 . Local stability results in different situations. equilibrium situation1 situation 2 situation 3 situation 4 λ 1 ，λ 2 ，λ 3 condition λ 1 ，λ 2 ，λ 3 condition λ 1 ，λ 2 ，λ 3 condition λ 1 ，λ 2 ，λ 3 condition 
Simulation Analysis
Suppose: the time of evolution game begins with 0 and ends with 5. At the same time, the benefits from the technological innovation is constantly greater than that from non-innovation, that is, when (1 − δ) − 1 − 2 > 0 , tR + N + 2 − α( 1 − ∆ ) > 0 and (1 − t)R + M − (1 − α)( 1 − ∆ ) > 0. according to this set of conditions, set the relative size of initial parameters as follows:
The benefits bring by technological innovation: R = 10、 = 15、 = 5、∆ = 1; the cost of innovation: 1 = 2.5、 1 = 1.5; welfare transfer coefficients: 2 = 1.2、 = 0.5、 = 0.6; sharing coefficients: = 0.65， = = 0.5， = 0.6.
The benefits from technological innovation: R = 10、 = 15、 = 5、∆ = 1; the cost of innovation: 1 = 2.5、 1 = 1.5 ; welfare transfer coefficients: 2 = 1.2、 = 0.5、 = 0.6 ; sharing coefficients of government, enterprise and employee in different situation: = 0.65， = = 0.5， = 0.6. Figure 1 shows the evolvement status of three parties in game when government, enterprise and employee have the same willingness to participate (x = y = z) and when the benefits from technological innovation is greater than costs. The figure 1 also shows that the final strategy choices of government, enterprise and employee will converge to a stable state (1,1,1) , whether the willingness of three parties of game to participate innovation is at high level (x = y = z = 0.9), medium level (x = y = z = 0.5) or at low level (x = y = z = 0.1). This means that three parties of game will participate in technological innovation when innovation can produce positive benefits. This conclusion is consistent with the assumption of this paper.
Participation Willingness and Strategy Choices
Notes: ○: Government; △: Enetrprisel;*:employee Figure 2 shows a result that only increases 1 and remain all the other parameters the same, which means to increase only the cost of technological innovation for employee and enterprise, so as to verify influence to innovation behavior of enterprise and employee. As can be seen from the figure 2, when government strategy choices are "support", it is still able to get positive benefits which leads to the government's curve converges to 1, and the curve between enterprise and employees almost overlaps and converges to 0, and reaches to stable state (1,0,0). This is consistent with situation 1. Figure 3 shows the results that only decreses 1 and remain all the other parameters the same. From the figure 3, when innovation cost decreases, the curves of government and enterprise converge to 1, but the curve of employee goes up slowly and converges to 1, and finally reaches to stable state (1,1,1, ). Figure 2 . Innovation cost increase. Figure 3 . Innovation cost decrease. Figure 3 shows a result that only increase and remain all the other parameters the same. From the figure 3, at three kinds of participation willingness levels, the government and enterprise curves converge to 1, but the employee curve converges to 0, finally reaches to stable state (1,1,0) . This is consistence with situation 2. This shows that enterprise penalties for employees will increase the enterprise willingness to innovate, but in the meantime, it will hinder employee willingness to do technological innovation; further, the greater the penalties of enterprises, the less the willingness of employee to innovate. Figure 4 shows a result that increase 2 only and remain all the other parameters the same. The enterprise innovation enthusiasm will increase, when the government increases its subsidies for technological innovation. In addition, when the government willingness is lower ( = 0.1), the convergence rate of the enterprise curve is much lower than the rates of = 0.5 and = 0.9. It means that the stronger the government willingness to support innovation, the easier for enterprises to participate innovation. Figure 5 shows a result that increases only and remain all the other parameters the same. when employees ask company for too many resources for them to do technological innovation, that is, when it consumes excessive resources and result in over high extra losses, the company will refuse to do technological innovation no matter what willingness is. All this will make the enterprise curve converge to zero, the employee curve converges to 1, and finally all curves reach stable state(1,0,1). This is consistence with situation 3. Figure 6 shows a result that decrease N only and remain all the other parameters the same. Under this condition, the curves of government and enterprise converge to 1, but the employee curve increase first and then decrease along with the time. All curves reach finally stable state (1,1,0) . It indicates that employees are reluctant to innovate and enterprise is still to innovate.
The Change of Cost and Technological Innovation
Welfare Transfer Coefficients and Strategy Choice
The simulation results make it clear that the welfare transit coefficient N will hinder the enterprise to engage in technological innovation, but the size of N will determine whether or not employee is willing to do technological innovation. Figure 6 . Penalty coefficient N' increase. Figure 7 . Penalty coefficient N' decrease.
Research Conclusions
Based on the bounded rational hypothesis and Evolutionary Game theory, this paper establishes a tri-game model of "government guidance-enterprise participation-employee implementation", analyzes systematically the strategic choices of government, enterprise and employee's when they face the technological innovation, simulate by using Matlab the game situation in different situation, and finally draw the conclusion as follows:
(1) When the benefits of technological innovation are positive, government, enterprise and employee are all willing to participate in it (see Figure 1 ). In addition, the attitude of government toward technological innovation will have varying degrees of impact on the behavior of companies and employees, among which enterprise are more sensitive to government behavior. Therefore, government should formulate diversified preferential policies for enterprises and enhance the enthusiasm of SMEs for technological innovation.
(2) From the perspective of enterprise, the government's support 2 and the innovation cost 1 are the main factors affecting the technological innovation of enterprises. This reflects in three aspects as follows: Firstly, the innovation cost 1 is the main obstacle to technological innovation for SEMs, and the sensitivity to innovation costs of enterprises is significantly greater than that of employees. That is, in the pursuit of profit maximization, when the cost of innovation rises sharply, the enterprise is more likely to stop innovate and then pursue for regular profits. Secondly, when the government raise the financial compensation 2 for SEMs, enterprise will show more positive attitude toward technological innovation. This shows that innovation costs and government compensation for enterprise are the main driving force for enterprise to participate in technological innovation. In the context of "new normal", the government should provide more financial support to enterprises, enhance the enthusiasm of enterprises to innovate, and create good innovation climate for SMEs.
(3) From the perspective of employee, the enterprise's penalties for employee M and the welfare transit coefficient N are the main factors to promote employee to engage in technological innovation. This reflects in two aspects as follows: Firstly, when employees are willing to participate in technological innovation and the cost of technological innovation is extremely high (see figure3), the penalties M imposed on employees is the key factors which hinder the willingness for employees to innovate in order to reduce the extra cost that produces by technological innovation. Secondly, the greater the resource transfer transit coefficient N, that is, when employees are engaged in technological innovation, they can get more help from the enterprise, the more employees are willing to innovate. Thus, in order to motivate employees to engage in technological innovation, enterprise is necessary to adopt a decentralization management method, appropriately reduce penalties for employees, and create a kind of relax team climate within the team to enhance the innovation performance of the enterprise.
